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ABSTRACT: In his article, “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Harry Frankfurt argues against 
economic egalitarianism and presents what he calls the “doctrine of sufficiency.” Ac-
cording to the doctrine of sufficiency, what is morally important is not relative eco-
nomic equality, but rather, whether somebody has enough, where “having enough” is 
a non-comparative standard of reasonable contentment that may differ from person to 
person given his/her aims and circumstances. The purpose of this paper is to show that 
Frankfurt’s original arguments in support for his doctrine of sufficiency have critical 
problems that Frankfurt himself does not properly recognize. In the end, I will argue 
that in order to solve these problems the doctrine of sufficiency cannot help but to in-
corporate certain prioritarian commitments – commitments which many would view 
as implying economic egalitarianism. This is embarrassing for a doctrine whose rai-
son d’être was mainly to defeat economic egalitarianism. 
KEYWORDS: Egalitarianism – Frankfurt – prioritarianism – sufficiency – sufficientari-
anism.  
1. Introduction 
 In “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Harry Frankfurt gives a very incisive criti-
cism against “economic egalitarianism” understood as a doctrine that claims 
that there is moral value in equality itself (cf. Frankfurt 1987). A major part 
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of the article tries to show why it is a deep mistake for anybody to hold eco-
nomic egalitarianism. Along the way, Frankfurt presents his own alternative 
doctrine to economic egalitarianism, which he calls “the doctrine of suffi-
ciency”. The doctrine of sufficiency claims that what is morally important is 
for people to have enough; where “having enough” is a non-comparative 
standard of reasonable contentment that may differ from person to person 
given his/her aims and circumstances. In his original paper, Frankfurt pre-
sents two main arguments in support for his doctrine of sufficiency. The pur-
pose of this paper is to show that both of these arguments have critical prob-
lems that Frankfurt himself does not properly recognize.1
 The reason why an equal distribution of resources results in an undesir-
able outcome in the above situation is mainly because of the existence of 
what Frankfurt calls “utility thresholds”. Frankfurt’s main use of the notion of 
“utility thresholds” was to object to “the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility”. According to the principle of diminishing marginal utility, when 
somebody consumes a certain type of good, the marginal utility that that 
good brings to that person tends to diminish. This is mainly because people 
 
2. Utility thresholds and the condition of scarcity 
 We start with Frankfurt’s own example: the size of population is ten,  
a person needs at least five units of resources in order to survive, and there 
are forty units of resources. If we are intending to save anybody from this 
situation, then it is necessary that some must receive more than others; in 
other words, if we are intending to save at least one person, then, inequality is 
necessary.  
 We can see that, in this situation, an equal distribution of resources based 
on economic egalitarianism results in the worst possible outcome; namely, 
that everybody dies. Frankfurt (1987, 30) claims that “Surely in this case it 
would be morally grotesque to insist upon equality!”.  
                                                          
1  After the publication of Frankfurt’s seminar paper, the doctrine of sufficiency has 
attracted both proponents (see Anderson 1999; Benbaji 2005; Crisp 2003; Frankfurt 
1987; Frankfurt 1997; Huseby 2010) as well as opponents (see Casal 2007; Roemer 
2004), and there exists a vast literature that has been developed afterwards. However, 
the main focus of this paper will be on Frankfurt’s original arguments against eco-
nomic egalitarianism contained in his original paper. 
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generally tend to get satiated and derive less satisfaction towards the same 
good when they consume it over and over again.  
 However, Frankfurt points out that not all goods follow this rule. This is 
because there are certain goods that actually bring more utility to the person 
after sustained consumption than at first. This is when proper appreciation of 
the good gradually develops only after being exposed to a series of repeated 
trials and experiences. Here, the repeated trials and experiences serve as what 
Frankfurt calls a “warming up” process (see Frankfurt 1987, 26). It is easy to 
find numerous examples of this sort of good in our ordinary life; classical 
music, fine art, art house movies, certain types of gourmet food all require 
constant effort and a development of a certain level of maturity in order for 
the person to give proper appreciation to it.  
 Frankfurt explains that, when the good in question is money, what corre-
sponds to this “warming up process” is “saving”. This usually happens when 
one is trying to buy a certain good that gives unrivaled satisfaction compared 
to other goods, but which is too expensive for one to purchase unless one 
saves up for it. In this case, the last dollar saved that completes the full price 
of that good would give a utility that is far greater than any other dollar saved 
up to that very point. Here, the last saved dollar permits what Frankfurt 
(1987, 27, 30) calls a crossing of a “utility threshold”. Generally speaking, 
whenever there is a utility threshold for a certain good, a non-continuous 
jump in utility gain occurs at that very crossing threshold point. This makes 
the total utility achieved by crossing the utility threshold much greater than 
the individual sum of the utility gained by each individual unit of the good 
taken separately. In this sense, there is an additional value that is attached to 
the completion of a utility threshold itself when a good happens to have one.2
                                                          
2  So, Frankfurt plausibly explains that a complete collection of 20 different items 
has a greater utility than an incomplete collection of 20 items that include duplicates. 
Here, completeness of the collection itself possesses utility. See Frankfurt (1987, 27-
28, footnote 12).  
  
 We can see that, in the previous example, each individual has a utility 
threshold; the utility threshold is five units of resources. Five units of re-
sources is the borderline which demarcates life and death. So, anybody hav-
ing five units of resources acquires a gain in utility that is significantly larger 
than the utility a person achieves when the person has only four or less than 
four units of resources.  
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 We can also see that the situation is depicted in a way that the total 
amount of available resources is scarce; there are forty units of resources and 
there are also ten people which each need five units of resources in order to 
survive. This means that there are not enough resources to put everybody 
above the utility threshold; more specifically, in this case, there are not 
enough resources to save everybody’s life. 
 The main reason why an equal distribution of resources is problematic is 
because an equal distribution would generally tend to generate a much fewer 
number of individuals who are above the utility threshold when resources are 
scarce; in this case, an equal distribution would put everybody below the 
threshold. This consequence is hard to accept especially when being below 
the threshold means something grave, such as death, as it is the case in the 
above situation.  
 So, in order to save at least one person in the above situation, an unequal 
distribution of resources is necessary. Presumably, the most reasonable dis-
tribution in this case would be to save eight persons with the forty remaining 
units of resources by giving each of them the five requisite units for survival. 
Since it is practically feasible to save a total of eight persons in the situation, 
any alternative distribution that saves less than eight persons seems hardly 
morally defensible.3
 This is why economic egalitarianism seems morally problematic in this 
particular example; it kills everybody when it is perfectly possible to save 
eight. So, it seems, at first sight, that economic egalitarianism cannot be  
a reasonable solution to this example.
 If a certain distribution principle saves less than eight 
people, then this is a strong reason to think that the distribution principle in 
question is not the correct one for this particular situation.  
4
                                                          
3  Anybody who proposes an alternative distribution that saves less than eight per-
sons would have to justify why his/her preferred distribution would be better even 
though it kills more people than what is necessary. It seems very unlikely for anybody 
to be able to offer any cogent justification of this sort.  
4  The reason why I say “first sight” is that I will later suggest a possible way for 
economic egalitarianism to solve this problem.  
 However, the crucial question is not 
whether or not economic egalitarianism is a reasonable solution, but whether 
or nor Frankfurt’s doctrine of sufficiency itself can be a reasonable solution to 
this situation. Then, the crucial question is: Can the doctrine of sufficiency 
save eight persons?  
54  H U N  C H U N G  
 Frankfurt almost seems to take it for granted that his doctrine of suffi-
ciency will be able to save eight persons; in fact, his main purpose of present-
ing the above example in the first place was to show that his doctrine of suf-
ficiency is superior to economic egalitarianism in precisely this respect. 
Frankfurt writes:  
Under conditions of scarcity, then, an egalitarian distribution may be mo-
rally unacceptable. Another response to scarcity is to distribute the availa-
ble resources in such a way that as many people as possible have enough, 
or in other words, to maximize the incidence of sufficiency. This alterna-
tive is especially compelling when the amount of a scarce resource that 
constitutes enough coincides with the amount that is indispensable for 
avoiding some catastrophic harm – as in the example just considered, 
where falling below the threshold of enough food or enough medicine 
means death. (Frankfurt 1987, 31 emphasis added) 
 Here, Frankfurt implies that the distribution principle of ‘distributing the 
available resources in such a way that as many people as possible have 
enough’ or, in other words, the distribution principle of ‘maximizing the inci-
dence of sufficiency’ would be able to save the maximum number of persons 
(in this case, eight) and that this would be the distribution principle that the 
“doctrine of sufficiency” would mandate. However, as it becomes evident in 
the later part of the article, this doesn’t actually turn out to be the case. This is 
because the doctrine of sufficiency does not construe “having enough” as 
“having the amount of resources that is necessary to avoid some catastrophic 
harm (i.e. death)”.  
 In section VII of the article, Frankfurt explicates quite clearly what the 
doctrine of sufficiency regards as “having enough”. There, Frankfurt distin-
guishes between two senses of “having enough”; one is that a limit has been 
reached which implies that having more would be undesirable, and the other 
is that a certain requirement or standard has been met without any implica-
tion that a larger quantity would be bad. According to Frankfurt,  
In the doctrine of sufficiency the use of the notion of “enough” pertains to 
meeting a standard rather than to reaching a limit. To say that a person 
has enough money means that he is content, or that it is reasonable for 
him to be content, with having no more money than he has. And to say 
this is, in turn, to say something like the following: the person does not (or 
cannot reasonably) regard whatever (if anything) is unsatisfying or dis-
 I S  H A R R Y  F R A N K F U R T ’ S  “ D O C T R I N E  O F  S U F F I C I E N C Y ”  S U F F I C I E N T ?  55 
tressing about his life as due to his having too little money. (Frankfurt 
1987, 37) 
 So, to put it in a simplistic way, “having enough”, according to the doc-
trine of sufficiency, means one has enough to be reasonably content with 
one’s life while leaving open the possibility that one would be willing to have 
more if this were an option that could be achieved without paying significant 
costs. In other words, having enough is compatible with having a mild pref-
erence towards having more.  
 What “having enough” rules out, according to Frankfurt, is having an ac-
tive interest to seek more money than what one already has (cf. Frankfurt 
1987, 39). So, when one has enough, one might still be aware that one’s 
situation could be made better than the way it is now; but one does not really 
care about whether or not one’s situation could be improved since one is al-
ready quite content with the way things are right now. In other words, when 
one has enough, say, money, we can say that one finds his/her current mone-
tary situation reasonably satisfying. 
 However, when can we say that somebody’s contentment of his/her cur-
rent state of affairs is reasonable? If “having enough” means “being reasona-
bly content”, then what does “being reasonably content” imply? Frankfurt 
provides a quite explicit answer:  
It is essential to understand that having enough money differs from mere-
ly having enough to get along or enough to make life marginally tolerable. 
People are not generally content with living on the brink. The point of the 
doctrine of sufficiency is not that the only morally important distributional 
consideration with respect to money is whether people have enough to 
avoid economic misery. A person who might naturally and appropriately 
be said to have just barely enough does not, by the standard invoked in 
the doctrine of sufficiency, have enough at all. (Frankfurt 1987, 38, em-
phasis added)  
 So, according to the doctrine of sufficiency, “having enough” doesn’t 
mean “having barely enough to survive” since one cannot be reasonably con-
tent if one only has barely enough; as Frankfurt himself claims “people are 
not generally content with living on the brink”.  
 However, we can see in the previous example that giving somebody five 
units of resources is equivalent to giving that person just barely enough re-
sources to survive, since it is assumed that five units of resources is the 
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minimum amount for anybody to sustain life. This means that the doctrine of 
sufficiency cannot regard giving five units of resources to somebody in the 
previous example as giving that person “enough”.  
 It seems, then, reasonable to suppose that each individual consists of two 
separate utility thresholds; (a) the threshold of basic survival and (b) the 
threshold of reasonable contentment. What the doctrine of sufficiency regards 
as “enough” or “sufficient” is when an individual has enough resources to 
cross the latter threshold not the former threshold. When one is merely pro-
vided with resources that enable one to barely cross the first utility threshold, 
then, according to Frankfurt, the person “does not, by the standard invoked in 
the doctrine of sufficiency, have enough at all.”  
 This means that saving eight individuals by giving each of them five units 
of minimum resources in the previous example cannot be an instance of ‘dis-
tributing the available resources in such a way that as many people as possi-
ble have enough’ that is mandated by the doctrine of sufficiency. In fact, as 
long as the two utility thresholds of basic survival and reasonable content-
ment do not coincide (as it is the case in most practical situations), distribut-
ing five units of resources to eight people would actually be a way to mini-
mize the incidence of sufficiency; the incidence of sufficiency, in this case, 
would be zero.  
 Let’s illustrate this from a more concrete example. Consider the following 
situation  
 Frankfurt’s Example of Scarcity Modified  
 1. Available Resources: 40 units 
 2. Individuals: Andy, Bob, Chad, Derk, Erin, Fred, Gil, Hun, Ion, Jay 
(total: 10 persons)  
 3. The Utility Thresholds of Each Individual 
 
Individual’s Name Andy Bob Chad Derk Erin Fred Gil Hun Ion Jay 
Utility Thresholds 
a) Threshold of Survival 
b) Threshold of Reason-
able Contentment 
(= Threshold of Suffi-
ciency) 
 
(a) 5 
(b) 6 
 
(a) 5 
(b) 6 
 
(a) 5 
(b) 6 
 
(a) 5 
(b) 7 
 
(a) 5 
(b) 7 
 
(a) 5 
(b) 8 
 
(a) 5 
(b) 9 
 
(a) 5 
(b)10 
 
(a) 5 
(b)11 
 
(a) 5 
(b)12 
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 This is a modified version of Frankfurt’s example of the situation of 
scarce resources. In this modified version, the utility thresholds of each of the 
ten individuals are revealed.  
 We can see that each individual has two separate utility thresholds; (a) the 
threshold of survival and (b) the threshold of reasonable contentment. The 
threshold for survival is the same for every individual; everybody needs at 
least five units of resources in order to maintain life, and this is so regardless 
of each individual’s personal characteristics or temperaments.  
 However, the threshold for reasonable contentment differs from person to 
person. This is because the amount to which one may feel reasonably satis-
fied is partly a function of the individual’s personality, as well as his/her own 
way of valuing things in life, which may have developed throughout the indi-
vidual’s course of life. Note that different people may have different thresh-
olds of what they regard as “enough” satisfaction; some people might simply 
have what are known as “expensive tastes” which require a lot of resources to 
satisfy (e.g. Jay in the above example); others might have very modest tastes 
which can be quite easily satisfied even by a meager amount of resources 
(e.g. Andy in the above example.)  
 It is important to understand that recognizing that different people have 
different thresholds of reasonable contentment (or sufficiency) is an integral 
part of the doctrine of sufficiency. We can see this from the fact that one of 
the major criticisms that Frankfurt raises against economic egalitarianism is 
that economic egalitarianism is essentially alienating in the sense that it fo-
cuses primarily on the sheer size of how economic benefits are distributed 
without taking people’s specific interests and needs into account. Frankfurt 
writes:  
A concern for economic equality, construed as desirable in itself, tends 
to divert a person’s attention away from endeavoring to discover – with-
in his experience of himself and of his life – what he himself really 
cares about and what will actually satisfy him, although this is the most 
basic and the most decisive task upon which an intelligent selection of 
economic goals depends. Exaggerating the moral importance of eco-
nomic equality is harmful, in other words, because it is alienating. 
(Frankfurt 1987, 23) 
Frankfurt emphasizes essentially the same point in a later paper, when he 
writes: 
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Egalitarianism is harmful because it tends to distract those who are be-
guiled by it from their real interests. (…) The essential thing is not that he 
compares his situation with theirs, but that he understands his own needs. 
(…) What one person will require in order to serve his own most authen-
tic interests effectively does not depend upon what another person has. 
His requirements may differ very considerably (…) from the requirements 
of individuals who are devoted to attaining goals that differ from his. (…) 
The erroneous assumption that equality is worth having for its own sake 
distracts people, in other words, from what is most essential. It leads them 
to become alienated from themselves. (Frankfurt 2000, 91-92) 
 So, we can say that one of the major merits that the doctrine of suffi-
ciency has in relation to economic egalitarianism is that it respects, at the 
level of economic distribution, what is truly important to individuals by try-
ing to provide what is sufficient for each specific person given his/her spe-
cific circumstance, aims, and needs. In other words, it is important to under-
stand that it is an essential part of Frankfurt’s doctrine of sufficiency that it 
recognizes that different people may have different thresholds of reasonable 
contentment assessed from his/her own specific circumstances, aims, and 
needs, and that it is this threshold of reasonable contentment – which differs 
from person to person – that the doctrine of sufficiency so emphatically urges 
to satisfy.  
 This means that when the doctrine of sufficiency tries to maximize the in-
cidence of sufficiency, what it is trying to maximize is, not the number of 
people who has barely crossed the minimum level of subsistence, but rather, 
the number of people who is quite satisfied with his/her life; in other words, 
based on the example that I have provided above, what the doctrine of suffi-
ciency tries to maximize is the number of people who cross threshold (b)  
(= the threshold of reasonable contentment) not threshold (a) (= the thresh-
old of survival).  
 So, when we apply the doctrine of sufficiency to the above example, the 
distribution that would maximize the incidence of sufficiency would be sav-
ing Andy, Bob, Chad, Derk, Erin, Fred by giving them each 6, 6, 6, 7, 7, 8 
units of the 40 units of available resources. This is the best way to maximize 
the incidence of sufficiency given the available resources.  
 Here, we can see that we have managed to make 6 individuals quite con-
tent with their own lives while letting 4 individuals die of starvation. Since it 
was possible to save 8 individuals by distributing 5 units of resources to each 
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of them with the 40 units of available resources, what this shows is that the dis-
tribution required by the doctrine of sufficiency actually kills 2 additional indi-
viduals when it was perfectly possible to save these two people from dying.  
 Moreover, the reason why these two individuals had to die is mainly be-
cause, the doctrine of sufficiency, in an attempt to maximize the incidences 
of sufficiency (at the level of reasonable contentment), used up the remaining 
resources, which were left after saving the lives of 6 individuals, to further 
satisfy these individuals’ non-basic needs in order to make them content with 
their lives to the extent that they no longer have any active interest to seek 
more, when it was perfectly possible to use these remaining resources to sat-
isfy other people’s basic needs and save two more lives! In other words, by 
following the doctrine of sufficiency, 2 additional lives had to be sacrificed in 
order to fully satisfy the non-basic needs of 6 individuals. In any case, this 
seems hardly morally justifiable.  
 Although it is true that the satisfaction of certain non-basic needs is im-
portant for somebody to lead a sufficiently satisfying life given his/her spe-
cific aims and interests, the importance of leading a sufficiently satisfying life 
cannot be compared to the importance of saving a human life itself. There-
fore, whenever the satisfaction of non-basic needs and saving a human life 
conflict, it seems prima facie that the saving of a human life should always 
take precedence over the satisfaction of non-basic needs. The doctrine of suf-
ficiency is flawed to the extent that it takes the precedence between the satis-
faction of non-basic needs and saving a human life backwards; and we can 
see that this is the case in the above example.  
 It should be further noted that this flaw of the doctrine of sufficiency is 
not confined to such farfetched thought experiments. Whenever there is  
a scarcity of resources – where not everybody’s basic needs can be fully met 
or where everybody’s basic needs can be fully met but only barely – the doc-
trine of sufficiency would always recommend a distribution policy that would 
leave the basic needs of much more people left unsatisfied than what was 
practically achievable; in other words, whenever we apply the doctrine of 
sufficiency in circumstances of scarcity, there would always be cases where 
some people’s basic needs are sacrificed for the sake of satisfying other peo-
ple’s non-basic needs. And this is a reason to think the doctrine of sufficiency 
is flawed in some morally important way.  
 Then, how might Frankfurt reply to this objection? There seems to be  
a number of moves that he can make. One move (as it is motivated by the 
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above example) is to allow the existence of multiple sufficiency thresholds 
that range from minimum basic subsistence to reasonable contentment to full 
contentment, and claim that the satisfaction of somebody’s lower sufficiency 
threshold takes lexicographic priority over the satisfaction of another per-
son’s higher threshold. This is actually a move that Robert Huseby makes 
when he defends a dual-threshold version of the doctrine of sufficiency –  
a version that assumes a maximal (i.e. the threshold of reasonable content-
ment) and a minimal (i.e. the threshold of critical survival) sufficiency 
threshold – and claims, 
First, individuals below the maximal sufficiency threshold should have 
absolute priority over individuals above this threshold. (…) Between the 
minimal and maximal sufficiency thresholds, I propose that we should 
apply a constrained and inverse form of prioritarianism. (…) Second, 
strong priority should be given to those below the minimal sufficiency 
threshold. (Huseby 2010, 184-185) 
 This modification of the doctrine of sufficiency will indeed solve the 
problem presented in “Frankfurt’s Example of Scarcity Modified” above and 
successfully save 8 people. However, Huseby’s dual-threshold version of the 
doctrine of sufficiency faces a problem from which Frankfurt’s original ver-
sion of the doctrine of sufficiency is actually free: the problem of wasted re-
sources.  
 Consider two individuals: call them individual 1 and individual 2. Sup-
pose both individuals’ minimal sufficiency thresholds (i.e. the threshold of 
critical survival) and maximal sufficiency thresholds (i.e. the threshold of 
reasonable contentment) are respectively 5 and 7 units of resources. Suppose 
that individual 1 already owns 7 units of resources (i.e. he/she meets his/her 
maximal sufficiency threshold) while individual 2 owns nothing. Suppose 
that we have 1 additional unit of resource to distribute. Note that there is no 
way to redistribute the total amount (i.e. 8 units) of resources that could save 
both individuals.  
 Huseby’s dual-threshold version of the doctrine of sufficiency, by giving 
absolute priority to individuals below the maximal threshold over individuals 
above it, requires us to distribute the additional unit of resource to individual 
2. As a result, individual 2 dies and the resource is wasted. In other words, 
Huesby’s dual-threshold version of the doctrine of sufficiency morally re-
quires us to waste resources in this situation. Note that Frankfurt’s original 
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doctrine of sufficiency does not suffer from the same problem, as it gives no 
priority to distributing the remaining resources to the worse-off unless doing 
so raises that person above the threshold of reasonable contentment.5
 Another move that Frankfurt may make to solve our imminent problem is 
to restrict the doctrine of sufficiency with what may be called the “Scanlo-
nian Proviso”.
 So, 
modifying Frankfurt’s doctrine of sufficiency in a way that takes account of 
multiple sufficiency thresholds will not solve the problem without cost.  
6
                                                          
5  This will become more apparent a little bit later. 
6  I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this for me.  
 According to Scanlon, an action X in circumstances C is 
wrong if and only if “any principle that permitted one to do X in those cir-
cumstances could, for that reason, reasonably be rejected” (Scanlon 1998, 
95). In light of this, one may restrict Frankfurt’s doctrine of sufficiency as 
follows: 
 Frankfurt’s Doctrine of Sufficiency with Scanlonian Proviso 
Maximize the incidence of sufficiency – interpreted as reasonable con-
tentment – unless doing so would be disallowed by a principle that one 
may not reasonably reject.  
 A general principle that states, “Do not kill more human lives than what is 
absolutely necessary”, seems to be one such principle that one cannot rea-
sonably reject. If we go back to “Frankfurt’s Example of Scarcity Modified”, 
now, with the Scanlonian proviso operating, Frankfurt’s doctrine of suffi-
ciency so restricted will no longer distribute the available resources in a way 
that saves only 6 rather than 8 people. This is because doing so will not be al-
lowed by the general principle, “Do not kill more human lives than what is 
absolutely necessary”, a principle that one may not reasonably reject. 
 This solves the problem. But, note that exactly the same move is available 
to the economic egalitarian as well. That is, the economic egalitarian may 
avoid the same problem by restricting the egalitarian principle with the Scan-
lonian proviso in exactly the same way. Consider:  
 Economic Egalitarianism with Scanlonian Proviso 
Distribute economic resources equally across individuals unless doing so 
would be disallowed by a principle that one may not reasonably reject.  
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 Restricted by the Scalonian proviso, economic egalitarianism will no 
longer distribute the available material resources equally (and, thereby, kill 
everybody) as doing so will be disallowed by the same general principle as 
above, which states “Do not kill more human lives than what is absolutely 
necessary”, a principle that nobody can reasonably reject. 
 What all this shows is that Frankfurt’s doctrine of sufficiency may solve 
the problem in “Frankfurt’s Example of Scarcity Modified” only by either (a) 
facing a new problem (i.e. the problem of wasted resources) or (b) by making 
a move that is also readily available for the economic egalitarian to use. In 
short, unlike what Frankfurt thinks, examples of scarcity do not give any par-
ticularly strong reasons to favor doctrine of sufficiency over economic egali-
tarianism.  
3. The doctrine of sufficiency and urgent needs 
 Frankfurt emphasizes that economic egalitarianism and the doctrine of 
sufficiency are logically independent; an equal distribution can entirely lack 
sufficiency, and a distribution that satisfies sufficiency can be quite unequal. 
So, considerations that support one stance cannot be presumed to support the 
other. However, Frankfurt argues that many proponents of economic egali-
tarianism provide grounds that actually support only the doctrine of suffi-
ciency and mistakenly think that they have provided grounds for economic 
egalitarianism. 
 One common way to argue for economic egalitarianism is to contrast the 
abject situation of the absolute poor and the situation of the rich. Frankfurt 
agrees that it is true that the fact that there are people who are suffering from 
abysmal poverty is itself a situation that is morally undesirable which calls 
for rectification. And in order to rectify the situation of the absolute poor it 
might even be necessary to redistribute the surplus resources of the rich and 
give it to the poor. Undoubtedly, this would make the resulting distribution 
more equal. However, according to Frankfurt, the mere fact that abysmal 
poverty is morally undesirable does not entail that there is something wrong 
with inequality itself, nor does the fact that improving the situation of the 
poor calls for a more equal distribution entail that equality itself was what we 
were aiming for when we tried to improve the situation of the poor. Rather, 
Frankfurt claims that the main reason why absolute poverty is morally objec-
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tionable is not because people suffering from absolute poverty have less, but 
because they do not have enough.  
 So, according to Frankfurt, when a proponent of economic egalitarianism 
argues that a more equal distribution is needed in order to improve the situa-
tion of the absolute poor, what he/she is really arguing for is not economic 
egalitarianism but rather the doctrine of sufficiency (see Frankfurt 1987, 33-
34). This conclusion is reinforced when we see that economic egalitarians are 
not usually troubled by the significant inequality that exists between the rich 
and the upper middle class.  
 Another typical confusion of the economic egalitarian, according to 
Frankfurt, is their ungrounded assumption that the worse-off person always 
has more urgent needs that are unmet than the better-off person. However, 
according to Frankfurt, this is not true; not only can the relatively worse-off 
person not have any urgent needs that are unsatisfied, but it might even be 
the case that the situation of the worse-off person is actually quite good. 
And if this were to be the case, Frankfurt claims that, a worse-off person 
could reasonably accept his/her current situation without presuming that any 
other distributive situation would make him or her worse (see Frankfurt 1987, 
36).7
Nagel illustrates his thesis concerning the moral appeal of equality by 
considering a family with two children, one of whom is “normal and quite 
happy” while the other “suffers from a painful handicap.” If this family 
were to move to the city the handicapped child would benefit from medi-
cal and educational opportunities that are unavailable in the suburbs, but 
the healthy child would have less fun. If the family were to move to the 
suburbs, on the other hand, the handicapped child would be deprived but 
 
 Frankfurt presents Nagel as a typical economic egalitarian who relies on 
the mistaken assumption that the worse-off person always has more urgent 
needs that are unmet than the better-off person in order to argue for the moral 
appeal of equality.  
                                                          
7  Here, we can see that Frankfurt is implicitly attacking the acceptability condition 
that Rawls’ “difference principle” ultimately relies on; according to Rawls, any un-
equal distribution must be able to be reasonably accepted even by the worst-off person 
of that specific distribution, and we cannot reasonably expect the worst-off person to 
accept an unequal distribution unless it can be shown that any other alternative distri-
bution would make his or situation even worse.  
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the healthy child would enjoy himself more. Nagel stipulates that the gain 
to the healthy child in moving to the suburbs would be greater than the 
gain to the handicapped child in moving to the city; in the city the healthy 
child would find life positively disagreeable, while the handicapped child 
would not become happy “but only less miserable.” (Frankfurt 1987, 36)  
 According to Frankfurt, Nagel claims that the egalitarian decision in this 
situation would be to move to the city. And the reason that Nagel provides in 
order to support this egalitarian decision is that, although it is true that the 
healthy child would benefit much more by moving to the suburb, the handi-
capped child has a much more urgent need that needs to be satisfied due to 
his being in a worse-off position.  
 However, according to Frankfurt, this is a mistaken analysis. Frankfurt 
agrees that the handicapped child has a much more urgent need that needs to 
be satisfied. This is so, even if the benefit that the healthy child would receive 
by the family moving to the suburb would be much greater. However, the 
main reason why the handicapped child has a much more urgent need that 
must take priority is not simply because the handicapped child is worse-off 
than the healthy child; it is rather because the condition that the handicapped 
child is suffering is significantly bad viewed from an absolute scale. There-
fore, Frankfurt claims,  
…the most cogent basis for Nagel’s judgment in favor of the handicapped 
child has nothing to do with the alleged urgency of providing people with 
as much as others. It pertains rather to the urgency of the needs of people 
who do not have enough. (Frankfurt 1987, 37)  
 In other words, according to Frankfurt, our moral intuition that tells us 
that the family should move to the city rather than the suburbs supports the 
doctrine of sufficiency rather than economic egalitarianism.  
 However, again I am not sure whether the doctrine of sufficiency can 
really explain why the family should move to the city in order to satisfy the 
more urgent need of the handicapped child. Suppose for the sake of argument 
that the morally right answer to Nagel’s example is for the family to move to 
the city. Remember that the doctrine of sufficiency aims to maximize the in-
cidences of sufficiency where an incidence of sufficiency is achieved when 
one is provided with enough resources that enable him or her to cross the 
threshold of “reasonable contentment”.  
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 In the above example, the healthy child is described to be “normal and 
quite happy”. From this we can infer that the healthy child is already above 
the utility threshold of “reasonable contentment”. Again, the fact that the 
healthy child is above the threshold of reasonable contentment doesn’t im-
ply that giving more to the healthy child would not give him more satisfac-
tion.  
 Then, what about the handicapped child? The handicapped child is de-
scribed as “suffering from a painful handicap”. From this it is reasonable to 
infer that the handicapped child is below the utility threshold of reasonable 
contentment. However, we can say that the handicapped child is still above 
the threshold of survival; this is because the child’s handicap, although se-
vere, is not something that threatens the child’s life. This means that the 
handicapped child’s utility level would be somewhere in between the thresh-
old of survival and the threshold of reasonable contentment; presumably, the 
handicapped child’s utility level is much closer to the threshold of survival 
than it is to the threshold of reasonable contentment considering that the child 
is suffering from a, not just ordinary, but a “painful” handicap.  
 Now, in order to see which decision (between moving to the city and 
moving to the suburbs) that the doctrine of sufficiency would support, we 
would need to see which decision would actually maximize the incidences of 
sufficiency, where sufficiency is measured by whether or not somebody’s 
utility level is above the threshold of reasonable contentment.  
 If the family moves to the city, then the utility level of the healthy child 
drops below the threshold of reasonable contentment. This can be inferred 
from the fact that, by assumption, the healthy child would find life positively 
disagreeable in the city. If a “normal and quite happy” child starts to find his 
life “positively disagreeable”, then this suggests that the child is no longer 
reasonably content with his/her life. So, by moving to the city, the healthy 
child drops below the threshold of reasonable contentment.  
 Then, what happens to the handicapped child if the family moved to the 
city? The utility level of the handicapped child would undoubtedly go up; 
but, based on the assumption of the story, only marginally. This can be in-
ferred from the fact that if the family moved to the city, then the handicapped 
child would “not become happy but only less miserable.” In other words, al-
though the utility level of the handicapped child would go up, it would still 
be below the threshold of reasonable contentment. In short, even if the family 
moved to the city, the handicapped child would not achieve “sufficiency”. 
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 Now, suppose that the family moved to the suburbs. How would this 
make the situation turn out? In terms of the healthy child, moving to the 
suburbs would make the already quite happy child much happier. So, the 
utility level of the healthy child would still be above the threshold of rea-
sonable contentment but by a wider margin. In terms of the handicapped 
child, moving to the suburbs would definitely not increase the child’s utility 
level, but it would, nonetheless, not drop the utility below the threshold of 
survival; the handicapped child would not die even if the family moved to 
the suburbs. 
 So, here is the summary of the situation: if the family moves to the city, 
the total incidence of sufficiency drops from 1 to 0. If the family moves to 
the suburbs, then the total incidence of sufficiency remains the same, which 
is 1. Therefore, in order to maximize the incidence of sufficiency, the fam-
ily should move to the suburbs. In other words, it turns out that the doctrine 
of sufficiency supports the (non-egalitarian) decision to move to the sub-
urbs!  
 Let’s modify the situation in certain ways so that the doctrine of suffi-
ciency would generate the desired answer for the situation at hand; which is 
to support the family’s decision to move to the city.  
 First, what if we assume that the utility level of the healthy child would 
not drop below the threshold of reasonable contentment even if the family 
moved to the city; the healthy child would unquestionable find less enjoy-
ment than he/she would have if the family moved to the suburbs, but suppose 
that the child would still find his/her life quite satisfying in the city as well. In 
this case, the incidences of sufficiency would be the same (i.e. 1) regardless 
of whether the family moved to the city or whether the family moved to the 
suburbs. And if this were the case, wouldn’t the doctrine of sufficiency sup-
port the family’s decision to move to the city by considering the desperate 
situation of the handicapped child as the “tie breaker”? 
 Not necessarily. In order to see that the doctrine of sufficiency would not 
necessarily support the family’s decision to move to the city even in this 
situation, we would need to see what Frankfurt claims about the distribution 
of additional resources that would not contribute to increasing the incidences 
of sufficiency.  
 Suppose, in Frankfurt’s original example of scarce resources, the avail-
able resources were 41 units instead of 40 units. In this case, one unit of re-
source would still be left after saving eight people by giving them each five 
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units of resources which is required for minimum survival. How should this 
one extra unit distributed? According to Frankfurt, it doesn’t automatically 
follow from such situation that the remaining one extra unit should be given 
to one of the two persons who haven’t been allocated with any resources. Ac-
cording to Frankfurt, this is because,  
…one additional unit of the resource in question will not improve the 
condition of a person who has none. By hypothesis, that person will die 
even with the additional unit. What he needs is not one unit but five. It 
cannot be taken for granted that a person who has a certain amount of  
a vital resource is necessarily better off than a person who has a lesser 
amount, for the larger amount may still be too small to serve any useful 
purpose. (Frankfurt 1987, 31) 
Frankfurt adds,  
Those below a utility threshold are not necessarily benefited by additional 
resources that move them closer to the threshold. What is crucial for them 
is to attain the threshold. Merely moving closer to it either may fail to 
help them or may be disadvantageous. (Frankfurt 1987, 32) 
From this Frankfurt concludes, 
It may be morally quite acceptable, accordingly, for some to have more 
than enough of a certain resource even while others have less than 
enough. (Frankfurt 1987, 32)  
 This has very important implications for our current purposes, since we 
can think of the family’s decision on whether they should move to the city or 
whether they should move to the suburbs as essentially the same as the deci-
sion on how we should distribute the one extra unit of resource in our first 
example. 
  Regardless of which decision the family makes, the healthy child would 
always be above the threshold of reasonable contentment by assumption. 
However, the family’s moving to the suburb would make the healthy child’s 
life much more satisfying. In this way, the family’s moving to the suburb 
would be analogous to the decision of giving the extra unit of resource to one 
of the eight persons who already received enough resources to live; the fam-
ily’s moving to the suburb would be giving the healthy child more than 
enough, when his sibling, the handicapped child, has less than enough.  
68  H U N  C H U N G  
 By contrast, the family’s decision of moving to the city would be analo-
gous to the decision of giving the extra unit of resource to one of the two per-
sons who have not received any resources. Just as giving the extra unit of re-
source to one of these two persons would only make the person move slightly 
closer to the threshold of survival without crossing it, the family’s moving to 
the city would only let the handicapped child move slightly closer to the 
threshold of reasonable contentment without crossing that threshold; as it is 
assumed, the handicapped child would not become happy but only less mis-
erable by moving to the city.  
 If this is the case, then we can see that the doctrine of sufficiency would 
not necessarily recommend the family to move to the city. In fact, we can see 
from Frankfurt previous remarks that the doctrine of sufficiency would actu-
ally regard the family’s decision to move to the suburbs as morally accept-
able.  
 This is because, although it is true that the family’s moving to the city 
would improve the situation of the handicapped child, the improvement that 
the handicapped child would be too small for the doctrine of sufficiency to 
regard as morally significant. According to the doctrine of sufficiency, im-
provements are morally significant only when they make people cross 
thresholds of reasonable contentment. Since moving to the city does not 
make the handicapped child cross the threshold of reasonable contentment, it 
is perfectly permissible (or it might even be preferable), according to the doc-
trine of sufficiency, for the family to move to the suburbs. In short, even in 
this modified situation, the doctrine of sufficiency does not recommend the 
family to move to the city.  
 If we really want the doctrine of sufficiency to recommend the family to 
move to the city, it is necessary for us to modify both the situation as well as 
the doctrine of sufficiency itself.  
 First, the situation would have to be modified so that the handicapped 
child would die if the family moved to the suburbs and live if the family 
moved to the city. Second, we would need to make a move similar to that of 
Huseby and allow the existence of multiple sufficiency thresholds for which 
the satisfaction of lower sufficiency thresholds takes lexicographic priority 
over the satisfaction of higher sufficiency thresholds. That is, in order to al-
low the family to make the morally right decision to move to the city on the 
basis of the doctrine of sufficiency, the doctrine of sufficiency itself would 
have to be modified, perhaps, in the following way:  
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 The Lexicographic Doctrine of Sufficiency  
 (1) Maximize the incidence of crossing sufficiency thresholds. 
 (2) Whenever the satisfaction of two or more utility thresholds conflict, 
the satisfaction of the lower sufficiency threshold takes absolute prior-
ity over the satisfaction of higher sufficiency threshold.  
The lexicographic version of the doctrine of sufficiency would be able to rec-
ommend the family to move to the city in the modified scenario in which the 
handicapped child would die if the family moved otherwise.  
 This is because even if the healthy child’s welfare will drop below the 
threshold of reasonable contentment by moving to the city, the modified ver-
sion of the doctrine of sufficiency would still recommend the family to move 
to the city as such sacrifice is necessary to move the handicapped child above 
the critical threshold of survival – a threshold which takes lexicographic pri-
ority over the threshold of reasonable contentment of the healthy child. Also, 
unlike Frankfurt’s original doctrine of sufficiency, the lexicographic version 
would be able to save eight individuals in the first example of scarce re-
sources. However, this is all because, unlike the doctrine of sufficiency, there 
is a certain prioritarian element embedded in the lexicographic version of the 
doctrine of sufficiency; namely, that, in adjudicating which sufficiency 
threshold to satisfy, the threshold of the worse off person takes priority over 
that of the better off person.8
                                                          
8  For a defense of the priority view, see Parfit (1997; 2002). 
  
 However, it should be noted that even the lexicographic version of the doc-
trine of sufficiency would not be able to recommend the family to move to the 
city in Nagel’s original example, in which the handicapped child would not die 
regardless of where the family moved; this is because, in such case, there will 
be no conflict between satisfying either the lower sufficiency threshold of the 
handicapped child or the higher sufficiency threshold of the normal child, as 
the handicapped child will, in either option, remain in between the threshold of 
survival and the threshold of reasonable contentment. As the healthy child will 
be above the threshold of reasonable contentment in the suburbs while he/she 
will fall below such threshold in the city, the fact that the handicapped child 
will remain in between the thresholds of survival and reasonable contentment 
in either option mandates that even the lexicographic version of the doctrine of 
sufficiency will morally require the family to move to the suburbs.  
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 In order for the lexicographic doctrine of sufficiency to recommend the 
family to move to the city in Nagel’s original example, it must give up Frank-
furt’s basic stance concerning the distribution of additional resources that 
does not contribute to achieving any additional sufficiency thresholds; in 
other words, the lexicographic doctrine of sufficiency would have to claim 
that after maximizing the incidences of crossing sufficiency thresholds (in 
order of lowest to highest), any additional resources that are left should be 
distributed to the worse-off person even if this does not contribute to making 
that person cross any additional sufficiency thresholds.  
 However, by doing so, we can see that, now, not only does the doctrine of 
sufficiency have some prioritarian elements, but it has virtually collapsed into 
prioritarianism, which claims that “benefits to the worse off should be given 
more weight” even when doing so does not result in crossing of any addi-
tional sufficiency thresholds (cf. Parfit 1997, 213). Of course, prioritarianism 
is not exactly the same as economic egalitarianism; unlike economic egali-
tarianism, prioritarianism does not aim at achieving economic equality per 
se. However, it is clear that, by giving more moral weight to the worse off 
(independent of whether such measure results increases the number of cross-
ing sufficiency thresholds), in any given problem of economic distribution, 
prioritarianism has a built-in bias towards equality. This is why some authors 
have characterized prioritarianism as a doctrine that is “derivatively (if not, 
directly) egalitarian” (cf. Benbaji 2005, 312). In this sense, prioritarianism is 
a member of a broadly egalitarian family of views. This means that if we do 
think that it is morally preferable for the family to move to the city for the 
sake of the handicapped child in Nagel’s original example, then it seems that 
this cannot be properly explained without invoking some basic intuitions – 
more specifically, prioritarian intuitions – that naturally support economic 
egalitarianism. This is, indeed, a very embarrassing result for the doctrine of 
sufficiency whose raison d’être was mainly to defeat economic egalitarian-
ism.  
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